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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to trace the political development of
the American zone of occupation in Germany following World War II,
assessing its impact on the eventual division of Germany, as well as on
the Soviet-American conflict which dominated the post-war world.
This study will focus on the period dating from 1944, when Allied
victory over Nazi Germany seemed imminent and Germany s future was being
discussed at the highest levels of government, to early 1947, when the
American and British zones of occupation merged on an economic basis
(becoming known as Bizonia), which would pave the way for the formal
division of Germany in 1949.
The re-establishment of a viable political structure in the
American zone was based on democratic principles, the foremost being the
desire to return government to the German people. This effort had been
undertaken to promote the unification of Germany, but in fact it
facilitated the nation's division. A plan for unification could never
be agreed on by the four powers, even as the politicization of the
American zone continued in earnest. When necessity dictated that the
American and British zones unite along economic lines, American
officials sought to prevent the simultaneous growth of a bizonai
government, fearing that such a creation would be tantamount to
permanently dividing the country. The American emphasis on German
self-government — evidenced by a resurgence of political parties, the
holding of elections, and the drafting of constitutions -- created a
certain political momentum which was not easily stifled. A German role
in governing Bizonia was eventually accepted, and the country was
formally divided two years iater.
With regard to the origins of the Cold War, this thesis will show
that the occupation authorities perceived the primary stumbling block to
unification to be France, rather than the Soviet Union. The French
consistently refused to consider measures that might have led to
unification, until certain territorial questions were agreed upon. The
failure of the French to acquiesce, as much as anything else, forced the
United States to seek a bizonal arrangement with Great Britain in July
1946. A second point, arising from the first, is that the American
officials in Germany regarded the Russian delegation with considerably
less skepticism than officials at home. Therefore, while the United
States and the Soviet Union engaged in hostile declarations toward one
another throughout the early post-war period, relations between the two
countries delegations in Germany remained relatively cordial. It was
France who received the brunt of American hostility in Germany.
Negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union regarding
Germany finally broke down in March 1948, but by then the Cold War was
in ful1 swing.

Introduction
Eyebrows were raised when President Franklin Roosevelt met with
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland
in August 1941 to discuss post-war goals.

The United States was still

four months away from entering the war, and many wondered what business
Roosevelt had proclaiming what amounted to war aims.

The declaration

which resulted from the talks, commonly known as the Atlantic Charter,
contributed to the notion that by August 1941 the United States was a
non-belligerent in name only.

More importantly, the conference

indicated that American leaders had a clear conception of what they
wanted in the post-war world, and the confidence that they possessed the
means to realize these goals.

The United States was finally emerging

from the depression that had gripped the country, and the world,
throughout the 1930's and policymakers were determined to create an
international order that would eliminate those conditions which had
brought depression and war.
This post-war vision had both political and economic elements.
American leadership hoped to create an economic order best understood
under the rubric of multilateralism —

a system guaranteeing all nations

open access to raw materials and world markets.

Furthermore, it was

assumed that multilateralism could only flourish in a world composed of
democratic nations, the political corollary to an economic objective.
Economic freedom and political democracy may have shared top billing
at the Atlantic Conference, but even a cursory look at the wartime
planning of the United States indicates the degree to which economic
considerations dominated policy formulation.

The heated negotiations

with the imperial-minded British over the terms of Lend-Lease, as well

as the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, come readily to mind as
examples of American determination to solidify their multilateral
position before the end of the war.

This uneven planning suggests that

the United States was not entirely prepared for the tremendous job that
faced her in the post-war period, namely the occupation of the defeated
Axis nations.

Of course, even the wartime preparations for a

multilateral world could not have anticipated the tremendous destruction
in Europe and the Pacific, a vivid reminder of the distance between
American goals and the effort which would be necessary to realize them,

* * *

Lying at the heart of Europe —

literally and figuratively —

was

defeated Nazi Germany, and whatever the United States considered its
priorities to be, every area of German society needed rebuilding, not
the least of which was a viable political structure.

Compared with the

fall of the Imperial regime in 1918, and the Weimar failure fifteen
years later, the collapse of the Third Reich in May 1945 was easily the
most severe, given that the entire German governing apparatus had been
tainted by Nazism, leaving no foundation on which to construct future
government.

The job of establishing a political structure, then, would

be one of the primary tasks of the occupation.

Making this job more

difficult would be the presence of four occupying powers (United States,
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) each with its own conception of
what it wanted in a post-war Germany.
Within this context, this thesis will attempt to do three things.
First, it will trace some of the early political developments in the

American zone of Germany.

Second, it will highlight the relationship

between the political aspects of the occupation and certain significant
economic developments.

Much has been written on the economic policies

of the United States during the occupation period, most notably the
problems with the Soviet Union on the matter of reparations.

The

emphasis here will be on political issues, but it will become apparent
that when the United States was forced to make a major policy decision,
it was usually done with its economic interests in mind.
suggest that the political developments were unimportant.

This is not to
On the

contrary, the West German government which emerged in 1949 was as much a
result of the advanced degree of political activity in the American
zone, as it was a response to economic needs.
Finally, and with an eye toward the continuing debate on the
origins of the Cold War, this thesis will seek to show that American
political policy in the early occupation period was directed not toward
the division of Germany, but rather its unification.

The fundamental

economic and political differences between the United States and Soviet
Union should have made the eventual split less surprising, but in 1945
American officials felt

that agreement was both desirable and possible.

Indeed, it appears that

it was France,not the Soviet Union, which was

perceived to be the stumbling block to four-power unity in Germany.
However, growing tension outside Germany —
Moscow —

centered on Washington and

came to overshadow whatever degree of cordiality existed among

the four powers during the early stages of the occupation.

By focusing

primarily on the political developmentof Germany, and its relationship
to four-power unity, it

is hoped that thisthesis will provide some

3

understanding of the occupation's democratization program, and its role
in the eventual division of Germany.

4

1. Wartime Planning

The earliest attempt to establish a modus vivendi for control in
Germany began at the 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, at
which time the representatives of the Big Three —
Soviet Union, and Great Britain —
Advisory Commission <EAC>.

the United States,

agreed to the formation of a European

The primary function of the commission,

headquartered in London, was to prepare a joint allied approach to the
immediate post-surrender treatment of Germany.
produced two agreements in late 1944.

The work of the EAC

The first, on September 12,

called for the division of Germany, as well as its capital city of
Berlin, into three zones of occupation.

The second, on November 14,

established the machinery of the occupation —

an Allied Control Council

(ACC) to jointly administer Germany, and a Kommendatura to jointly
administer Berlin.1

The occupation zones and Control Council were

designed as interim measures, to be used until the occupying powers were
prepared to reunite Germany.

Unknown at the time, however, was that

these agreements would go a long way to ensure the very division it
sought to prevent.
Important as these accomplishments were, the EAC was equally
significant for what it did not accomplish. . As mentioned, the initial
agreement established zones of occupation in Berlin, itself in the
Soviet zone.

At the time it was assumed by Great Britain and the United

^reat Britain, Foreign Office, Selected Documents o r Germany and
the Question of Berlin. 1944-1961. 1961, pp. 27-33.
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States that implicit in the agreement was the right of unrestricted
access to their respective zones.
two reasons.

This assumption is significant for

First, it was maintained in the face of criticism.

George

Kennan, appointed as political advisor to John Winant, the American
representative to the EAC, argued against Winant's implicit reading of
the agreement.
after.2

He argued to no avail, and left the position soon

A second critic was Robert Murphy, newly appointed as political

advisor to General Eisenhower in Germany, and who had been sent to
London beforehand to observe the proceedings of the commission.

The

lack of an agreement disturbed him, and years later he would feel
partially responsible for not having pressed the point.^
The second, and more striking point, is that Winant's reluctance to
force the access issue was apparently politically motivated.

In London,

Murphy confronted Winant on the issue and was told, as Kennan had been
before him, that the right to free access was implicit in the United
States' right to be in Berlin.

According to Murphy, Winant added that

"the Russians . . . were inclined to suspect our motives anyway, and if
we insisted on this technicality, we would intensify their distrust."4
According to Winant's biographer, Bernard Bel lush, the creation of the
EAC had pleased Winant for the simple reason that it ensured the Soviet

2George Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1967), pp. 170-1.
^Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964), p.233.
4Ibid., p. 232.
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Union would be actively involved in the post-war planning.^

In 1948 the

right of direct access to Berlin would take on such importance that the
failure to secure it in 1944 would assume the status of a monumental
blunder.

However, in 1944 direct access to Berlin rated second in

priority to maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union.
Kennan has pointed out that President Roosevelt had no love for the
European Advisory Commission.

In fact, the commission had to narrow

considerably the scope of its activity to obtain the President's
approval, and only with additional urging from Secretary of State
Cordell Hull was it given.^

Hull felt that some sort of post-war

planning for Germany must get underway.

Roosevelt, as has often been

noted, was extremely reluctant to make decisions concerning the post-war
world, as it could possibly tie his hands at a later date.
EAC represented such a threat.

For him the

Kennan has suggested that one way the

President controlled the situation was to appoint Winant who, as well as
being the U.S. representative to the EAC, was the Ambassador to Great
Britain, effectively reducing his ability to participate as actively as
would a full-time delegate.^

Bel lush has further suggested that

"Winant's role was severely circumscribed by serious divisions in
Washington over German policy and the tensions created by departmental

^Bernard Bel lush, He Walked Alone (The Hague: Mouton and Company,
Publishers, 1968), p. 192.
6Kennan, pp. 164-5.
^Ibid., p. 165.
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p
rivalries."0

The combination of a non-committal President and

departmental strife resulted in Winant's inability to ever know exactly
what was expected of him, leaving him, according to Bel lush, "shaken and
embarassed."9
Winant's frustration suggests that his position was less functional
than political.

Simply put, he shared the President's views on the need

for Soviet-American cooperation.

That this was extremely important to

Roosevelt is i1lustrated by Robert Murphy, who wrote of a 1944 meeting
with the President:
He urged me to bear in mind that our primary
post-war objective was Soviet-American
cooperation — without which world peace would
be impossible — and that Germany would be
the proving ground for such cooperation.^
When Winant discounted suggestions by both Kennan and Murphy to reach an
explicit agreement over direct access to Berlin, it was simply because
American policy, for Roosevelt and Winant, demanded that German
questions be subsumed under a general policy of Soviet-American
cooperation.

Characteristically, Kennan responded to the activities of

the EAC by regarding as "unreal the hopes for collaboration with the
Russians in the governing of Germany."^

Kennan was prophetic in this

regard, and while he would eventually be vindicated, the mood in 1944
was one of cautious optimism.

®Be11ush, p . 194.
9Ibid., p. 192.
^Murphy, p. 227.
^Kennan, p. 180.

8

This optimism, however, was not grounded in any viable United
States policy toward Germany, or even a consensus on what to do with the
defeated Reich.

The failure of the United States to formulate a

coherent policy for Germany has long been a focus of criticism for
historians, typified by Manfred Jonas' comment that "neither the fact
that eventual victory was virtually certain by early 1943 nor the
primacy of Germany in American eyes resulted in the development of a
specific policy for Germany's future."*2

Jonas, like many, has placed

the blame for this state of affairs on Roosevelt, whose disdain for
wartime commitment is well known.

Even had Roosevelt sought policy

clarification, the process would have been clouded by conflicting
opinions from administration officials, Congress, and the public alike.
Roosevelt's own instincts were decidedly anti-Nazi, if not anti-German,
and even as delay defined his policy, his mind would prove fertile soil
for the proponents of a harsh peace, namely Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau.
The volume of sources alone indicates that the question of what to
do with Germany after the war was much-discussed among Americans during
the war.

Generally speaking, the debate centered on whether the Allies

should inflict on Nazi Germany a harsh peace, or employ a milder
approach, geared toward the eventual reconstruction of the country.
This debate was taken up in an October 1944 Newsweek article by American
journalist Dorothy Thompson and British diplomat Lord Vansittart,

12Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1984), p. 264.

9

whose name, like Morgenthau's, became synonomous with a harsh peace.
While Vansittart argued that the German people must be treated "without
sentiment or softness," Thompson took a more conciliatory approach,
insisting that "punishment and reconstruction must be divorced.

They

are not the same thing."13
A Fortune magazine survey in March 1945 indicates that the American
public was not necessarily in agreement with Thompson's approach.

Of

those polled, 31% believed Germany would never again be a "good" nation,
and another 37% felt it would take Germany at least twenty years to
reach that standard.

Only half of the respondents felt that Germany

should even be allowed to remain an industrial nation.

The magazine

also made a comparison based on a similar survey given in January 1944,
and the responses indicated growing frustration and hostility toward the
German enemy.

On the issue of partitioning Germany, 41% (up from 29%),

favored breaking the country into smaller units, and 62% (up from 46%)
favored using German labor to rebuild countries whom Germany had
devastated.

"In short," the magazine concluded, "the majority of

American people . . . believe the United Nations must rebuild the German
society from the ground up."14
Congress, too, reflected the divergent opinion over the treatment
of Germany.

Rep. Karl M. LeCompte of Iowa entered into the Record a

newspaper article from his predecessor, Rep. Lloyd Thurston, in which he

13.1Vansittart, Dorothy Thompson Argue the Hard Peace Question,"
Newsweek. October 9, 1944, pp. 104, 111.
14.1The Fortune Survey," Fortune. March 1945, pp. 254-262.
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proposed that Germany be prohibited from rebuilding her cities for
twenty years as a reminder of her wrongdoing.

Idaho Rep. Compton I.

White, also in an extension of remarks, cited former Ambassador to
Germany, James W. Gerard, who claimed that the "German people are a
hopeless problem for the world," and called for the dismemberment of the
country.

A more outrageous suggestion came from Rep. J. Buell Snyder of

Pennsylvania who suggested that the occupation authorities "must have a
key to every door in Germany for the next 60 years to be sure that all
individuals or groups are carrying out the fundamentals in the [Allied]
peace and security

p r o g ram."^

These harsh suggestions were answered by more conciliatory remarks
from other Congressmen.

Rep. Usher L. Burdick of North Dakota summed up

the feelings of this group when he stated that "the philosophy of
crushing Germany as a nation should be abandoned if we are actually
looking for a durable peace."

This sentiment was echoed by Sen. Glen H.

Taylor of Idaho who added, in the finest multilateral fashion, that the
"German economy is closely interlocked with the economy of all European
countries and to a lesser extent with world economy.

Decisions with

respect to German production will have repercussions in many other
l a n d s . T h e realization of Germany's central role in the economy of

S. Congress, House, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1 December 1943,
Congressional Record 80:A5234; 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 12 June 1944,
81:A3084; 79th Cong., 1st sess., 26 March 1945, 82:2779.
i6U. S. Congress, House, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 19 September 1944,
Congressional Record 81:A4151; Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 12
February 1945, 82:A582.
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Europe would eventually take root in American policy, but the mood was
such in early 1945, that Sen. Taylor's comment may have been deemed as
equally outrageous, maybe moreso, as that of Rep. Snyder's 60-year plan.
Taking the middle road was Rep. Albert Gore of Tennessee who,
following his return from a fact-finding mission, gave a lengthy speech
in March 1945 on conditions in Germany.

Sounding like a hardliner, Gore

bluntly stated that "justice cannot be done without punishment."

He

qualified this, however, with his conviction "that only a just peace
based on Christian principles can endure."1^

It is interesting to note,

that Gore's views seemed to have been affected by his first-hand look at
those parts of Germany already under occupation.

Later, after the

occupation had begun, the difference of opinion between those in
Germany, faced with the reality of the destruction, and those in
Washington, as to what course of action to follow, would be significant.
While Congress wrangled over the post-war issues, the men closest
to the President were no closer to agreement either.

The main

protagonists were Morgenthau, Hull, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson.
The problem between Hull and Stimson, according to Walter Dorn, was
differing conceptions of the "nature, scope, and duration of the
contemplated military government for Germany for which the War
Department felt itself to be in the first instance responsible."1®

170 . S. Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 19 March 1945,
Congressional Record 82:2454-5.
^Walter Dorn, "The Debate Over American Occupation Policy in
Germany in 1944-1945." Political Science Quarterly 72 (December 1957):
487.
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They did, however, basically agree on a broad plan of reconstruction for
Germany.

It was Morgenthau whose views were both controversial and

extreme.

Not surprisingly, on the eve of the September 1944 Quebec

Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill, the United States had yet to
establish a policy.

In a letter to the President, Hull wrote that this

was a problem of "great importance and considerable urgency," which
needed to be discussed before proceeding with any discussion with Great
Britain or the Soviet Union.
The program that the President ultimately accepted as the basis for
discussion at Quebec, no doubt to Hull's dismay, was the one proposed by
Morgenthau.

The fundamental premise of what came to be known as the

Morgenthau Plan was that "ending the menace of German aggression
consists, in its simplest terms, of depriving Germany of all heavy
industries.^

Morgenthau conceived of an agricultural and pastoral

Germany dominated by the farmer.

The specifics of the plan may not have

attracted Roosevelt as much as Morgenthau's belief, like Winant's, in
the inviolability of the Soviet-American relationship.

Morgenthau was

extremely critical of those he felt were advocating the reconstruction
of Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and communism, arguing
that "the nomination of Germany as the watchdog to guard us against
peril attains fantastic heights of m a d n e s s . R o o s e v e l t ' s acceptance

^Letter from Hull to Roosevelt, 28 August 1944, FRUS: Quebec.
19M .
^Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany is Our Prob1em (New York: Harper
and Bros., 1945), p. 16.
2*Ibid., p. 99.
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of this plan appears inexplicable unless one considers his determination
to extend Soviet-American wartime cooperation into peacetime.
The initial appeal of the Morgenthau Plan, however, could not
overcome its fundamental shortcomings.

Was it possible, after all, for

Roosevelt, promulgator of the Atlantic Charter, to embrace a program
that assumed a viable German economy was unnecessary for a strong
Europe?

Furthermore, could the President support a plan, whose author

disavowed the need to introduce democracy to the Germans, on the grounds
that "the present generation [of Germans] have become the most fanatical
haters of democracy ever known in the world," and that an established
democratic government would meet with the same fate as had the
government of the Weimar R e p u b l i c ? ^

The Presidents ill-advised

support for the Morgenthau Plan should not be interpreted as a move away
from the lofty goals of the Atlantic Charter.

For all of Morgenthau's

cynical observations on the prospects for democracy in Germany, the
question in late 1944 was not whether a democratic form of government
should be established, but how it would be accomplished.

* # #

Despite the administration's unofficial policy of postponing
difficult decisions, some degree of planning did take place during the
war, albeit at a lower, departmental level.

A State Department memo

prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS/623) in December 1943 stated

^Ibid., pp. 131, 140.
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that the "most desirable form of government for Germany would be a
broadly based democracy operating under a bill of rights to safeguard
the civil and political liberties of the individual."

The memo further

suggested that the "threat of Germany to general security might be
lessened through decentralization of the German political

structure."^

What was not known at the time was whether Germany would be partitioned
following her defeat.

Roosevelt favored partition, but the State

Department was adamant in its opposition, citing that "because of the
high degree of economic, political, and cultural integration in Germany,
it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed
but also maintained by force.“24
The State Department issued a more comprehensive statement of its
post-war political goals in May 1944.

The memo, prepared by the

Advisory Committee on Postwar Problems, had three primary proposals:
1) The United States should encourage democratic
se1f-government;
2) The allies should promote a federal government
structure, involving the division of Prussia
into several smaller states;
3) Political reconstruction should start on the
local level and extend to larger units as
success becomes apparent.
Broadly speaking, this was the program that would be implemented in
occupied Germany, yet since it came from a lower level committee, it

2^"U.S. Proposal for the Treatment of Germany," JCS/623, 18
December 1943, National Archives, Box 602.
24Memo by Committee on Postwar Problems, 5 August 1944, FRUS:
Quebec. 1944. p. 59.
^Memo by Committee on Postwar Problems, 31 May 1944, FRUS: Quebec.
1944. pp. 50, 53.
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never had the force of policy.

In fact, what is most striking about the

State Department correspondence of this period is the considerable
skepticism expressed in regard to the prospects for Soviet-American
cooperation.
A briefing paper prepared at the time of the Quebec Conference
stated that "nothing should be done along political lines [at the
Conference] which might jeopardize Soviet military cooperation against
Germany," but cautioned that the United States did not "intend to
acquiesce in Soviet policies which we consider internationally
destructive merely for the sake of avoiding unpleasant issues."^
Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman voiced his concern in a
letter to presidential advisor Harry Hopkins, writing that "the job of
getting the Soviet government to play a decent role in international
affairs is . . . going to be more difficult than we had hoped."27
However, in 1944 Franklin Roosevelt held sway over American foreign
policy and cooperation would be the primary objective.
Death would deny Roosevelt the opportunity to carry out his vision
for post-war cooperation.

The Yalta Conference in February 1945 proved

to be his last chance to enlist the goodwill of the Soviet Union in
tackling the problems of post-war Germany.
this regard.

Yet, little was achieved in

The primary accomplishment was the affirmation of the EAC

agreements establishing zones of occupation and control machinery for

^Department of State Briefing Paper, undated, FRUS: Quebec. 1944.
p . 193.
27Letter from Harriman to Hopkins, 9 September 1944, FRUS: Quebec.
1944. p. 199.
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Germany.

A second agreement was Stalin's acceptance of France as a

fourth member of the Control Council, and the granting to her of an
occupation zone, to be carved from the American and British z o n e s . In
contrast to his efforts toward Soviet-American cooperation, the
President had left little in the way of policy to govern the occupation
and, according to Jonas, even that was stated "in broad and frequently
contradictory terms, and those charged with its implementation were left
largely to find their own way between rhetoric and

28£BU3: Malta and Yalta. 1245. PP. 970-1.
Jonas, p. 264.
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2. Democracy in Germany

Not until the surrender of Germany did a comprehensive, if somewhat
controversial, strategy for the U.S. occupation emerge.

On May 14, 1945

a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive was issued to the Military Governor in
Germany, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

This directive, known as

JCS/1067, was a compromise between the occupation programs of the State
and War Departments and what Murphy called the "incongruous additions
inspired by the Morgenthau Plan."*

General Lucius D. Clay,2 the Deputy

Military Governor, wrote that there was no doubt that JCS/1067
"contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in
Germany during the early months of occupation."^

According to John

Gimbel, Clay was "shocked not by its [JCS/10673 punitive provisions, but
by its failure to foresee the economic and financial conditions that
prevailed."**

The primary objections to the directive, in fact, were the

extremely restrictive economic provisions.
The directive also contained very little of a constructive nature
regarding the political future of Germany.

In a brief statement, it did

*Murphy, p. 250.
2Clay, though Deputy Military Governor, was de facto in charge of
governing the American zone in Germany. Eisenhower was primarily
concerned with military matters, such as the transfer of troops to the
Pacific theater, and dealt little with occupation affairs. Clay became
Military Governor in 1947, a position he held until May 1949.
3Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1950), p. 19.
^John Gimbel, The American Qccupation of Germany (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 1.
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urge the decentralization of the political structure and the
development of local governmental responsibility.

More forcefully

expressed, however, was the restriction that "no political activities of
any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by [the Military
Governor]."

Oddly enough, the Military Governor was further requested

to ensure "that your military government does not become committed to
any political g r o u p . T h e drafters of JCS/1067 seemed to have conceded
that some political activity was inevitable, but were extremely
reluctant to encourage it at that point.

Resolution of this tension,

however, was not long in coming.
By the time JCS/1067 was released to the public in October, the
Potsdam Conference had convened and many of the harsh measures had been
modified.
—

JCS/1067 technically would remain in effect until July 1947

when it was replaced by JCS/1779 —

but it was effectively superceded

at Potsdam.

Potsdam also saw the eclipse of the influence of Henry

Morgenthau.

The controversial Treasury Secretary resigned on July 5,

apparently in response to his not being invited to the conference.^
The man responsible for provoking Morgenthau^ resignation was
Roosevelts successor, Harry S. Truman who, as a Senator, had opposed
the Morgenthau Plan.

Truman, however, in the first months of his

administration did not seek to upset the status quo with respect to
Germany.

With no foreign policy experience in his background, he was

Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation
Regarding the Military Government of Germany," JCS/1067/6, 26 April
1945, National Archives, Box 597.
^Murphy, p. 270.
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content to continue Roosevelt's policies, though he was more skeptical
of the Soviets than his predecessor.7

Harold Zink has written that

Truman's lack of experience manifested itself in a reluctance to become
involved in those situations most pressing, the result being that "for
about a year following the German capitulation it was virtually
impossible to get the White House to give attention to policy matters
relating to Germany."®

The effect of this was that the American zonal

authorities acted almost unilaterally, not only in respect to the other
occupying powers, but in respect to their own government as well.

Jean

Edward Smith has argued that American policy was formulated in an
"exceedingly ad hoc manner," a state of affairs which prompted Murphy to
write that Clay "was destined to become the most Influential American in
Europe during several crucial post-war years.
At a political level, Clay saw the problem confronting Germany as
being that of a political vacuum created by the defeat of the Nazis, a
vacuum which "had to be filled promptly with democratic leadership."*®
The results of the Potsdam Conference were to provide some guidance in

'Truman's remark after Germany's 1941 invasion of Russia: "If we
see that Germany is winning we should help Russia and if Russia is
winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as
possible . . . .", New York Times. 24 June 1941.
®Harold Zink, The Uni ted States in Germany. 1944-1955 (New York: D.
Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957), p. 89.
^Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clav. Vol.
1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. xxvii; Murphy, p.
251.
10Clay, p. 87.
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this effort.

Potsdam's declaration of ’political principles, like

JCS/1067, emphasized decentralization and the promotion of local
governmental responsiblity, but it backed off from the directive's
restrictions, and called for the encouragement of political activity on
the local level.11

As might be expected from a document reflecting the

input of the three powers, the political principles were fairly vague.
This not only ensured agreement at a tripartite level, but also granted
Clay considerable maneuverability in his actions.
The Potsdam declaration, however, contained a provision which,
unintentionally, would facilitate the move toward the division of
Germany.

Each of the political provisions, except one, granted rights

to the occupying powers in their respective zones.

The exception was a

stipulation that called for Allied cooperation in an interzonal effort.
Recognizing that certain functions would be better and more efficiently
performed at the national level —

such as finance, transport,

communications, foreign trade, and industry —
to set up central agencies for this

purpose.

^

the three powers agreed
Prior to Potsdam, Clay

had written Under Secretary of War John McCloy that he was optimistic
the Allies would agree to these national administrations.

The three

powers did agree at Potsdam, but later events would betray Clay's early
optimism, and strike a damaging blow to hopes for German unification.

U FRUS: Berlin (Potsdam). 1945. II, pp. 1481-1483.
^Ibid., p. 1483.
^Letter from Clay to McCloy, 16 June 1945, Clav Papers, p. 24.
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The French had been granted a zone of occupation and a place on the
Allied Control Council at the Yalta Conference.

However, the Yalta

conferees also agreed that France not be invited to participate at the
Potsdam gathering.

The French were determined to frustrate any plans

that called for centralization of any kind, for fear that this would
lead to a strengthened Germany.*4

In this respect, they possessed what

Murphy called a "double veto," not only the right to veto the
implementation of any proposal before the Control Council, but the right
to veto the implementation of any proposal previously agreed to at Yalta
or P o t s d a m . T h e issue of central agencies would remain tied up in the
Control Council until its demise im March 1948.

In the meantime,

government in the United States zone took shape.
* * #

Perhaps the best contemporary elaboration of the issue of German
government was given in a memorandum prepared by Harold Zink, while he
was with the Political Division of the Office of Military Government,
United States COMGUS).

The document was prepared in conjunction with

the Potsdam Conference, though the recommendations were much more
detailed than anything arising out of the conference, a good example of
the vacuum of official policy being filled by the military government
itself.

The primary objective of the occupation, according to Zink, was

*4Memo from Jefferson Caffery, Ambassador to France, to Byrnes, 3
November 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill, p. 890.
*^Murphy, p. 286.
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"to prevent a recurrence of such international menaces as German
militarism and national socialism."

He felt that an adequate

governmental structure would go a long way toward this goal.

He

cautioned that, in establishing this government, the American leadership
should not proceed on the basis of expediency and inadequate
knowledge.^
Years later, writing on the American occupation, Zink would
castigate Henry Morgenthau and his plan for failing to understand "the
17

deep-seated and indissoluble connections between Germany and Europe."1'
In 1945 Zink's message was the same: do not ignore Germany's past!

He

advised that it was important to consider the governmental system which
had evolved over time.

Failure to do so would lead to chaos and

undermine the occupation's primary political objective, "to prepare for
the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic
basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by
Germany."
In Hitler's Third Reich all governing functions had been
centralized at the Reich level, to the point that the government
controlled virtually every aspect of human activity.

Elaborating on the

already stated United States policy of decentralization of the political
structure, Zink recommended that government be re-established along the

^Memo by Harold Zink, FRUS: Potsdam. II, p. 766.
l^Zink, Uni ted States in Germany. p. 2.
18£HUS: Potsdam. II, p. 1482.
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Gemeinde (village), Kreis (county, city), Regierungsbezirk (region),
Land (state) structure, the traditional German federal structure, which
had been emasculated in Hitlers highly centralized Reich government.
In accordance with the Potsdam provisions, political activity in Germany
would begin at the local —

Gemeinde and Kreis —

level.

Zink felt that

giving Germans responsibility for the conduct of local affairs would be
good training in democracy.1^
fly July 1945, administrations at the Gemeinde, Stadtkreis (city),
and Landkreis (county) level had been established and German officials
appointed.

Regional administrations (Regierungsbezirk) had also been

established to supervise several counties, as well as to perform
functions not possible at the local level.20

One obstacle that had been

overcome in this period was finding competent people, who had also
resisted Nazism, to participate in the new government.

Mandatory

removal of Nazis from positions of responsibility, as called for by
JCS/1067 and later Potsdam, had caused some disruption early in the
occupation period, but Clay felt the results of this action to be
beneficial
In spite of these handicaps [disruption of essential
facilities], we believe that our prompt action in
removal of Nazis has speeded up the application of
democratic processes in Germany and will result in
stronger organizations at an earlier date than would
have been obtained by a more gradual release of Nazis.**1

^Ibid., p. 767, 771.
20Clay, p. 85? FRUS: Potsdam. II, p. 770.
21Letter from Clay to Hilldring, 14 January 1946, Clav Papers, p.
148.
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For Clay, the imposing task of denazification, far from being a
stumbling block to democratic growth, actually facilitated such growth.
With government operating at the local and regional level, U.S.
military authorities prepared for the formation of government at the
state (Land) level.

This step was called for by the Potsdam protocol,

and was consistent with American policy.

Clay would later write that,

"consistently we supported a structure which gave adequate but limited
powers to a federal government."22

in Germany this would involve

authority being vested in the Laender (states).

In the Third Reich,

Hitler had managed to strip the Laender of their historical prerogative
in German affairs and, according to Zink, it was "of first rate
importance that the Laender be restored to a position of vitality and
influence.''22

Not surprisingly, the July 1945 Military Governors

Report indicated that "modified governments have been established at all
levels up to and including state (Land) governments.1,24
Despite the establishment of a federal administrative structure,
the United States zone was still operating under a ban on political
activity, as dictated by JCS/1067.

Conversely, the Potsdam protocol

maintained that "all democratic political parties with rights of
assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged

22Clay, p. 17.
23M!3: Potsdam. II, p. 770.
Summary of July 1945 Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone,
Germany," JCS/1517, 19 September 1945, National Archives, Box 598.
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throughout Germany.2®

In fact, the Soviets had authorized political

activity in their zone on June 10, before Potsdam.

Not until August 27,

however, was a revised directive issued for the U.S. zone, "under which
military government officers may accept and approve applications for
permission to form democratic political parties to engage in political
activities at the Kreis level."2®

A USFET (U.S. Forces, European

Theatre) memo of September 19 explained the difficulty in such a
proposi tion
It is not possible to define the exact line between
political parties and other groups, but in general an
association of limited membership seeking to advance
by a common representation specific interests of its
members is not to be considered a political party.27
Two groups whose political party status was unquestioned were the
Communists and Social Democrats, who were active informally before the
lifting of the ban, especially in the urban areas.

This activity,

however, was not representative of the zone population as a whole.

In

fact, Brewster Morris of the Political Division reported on July 16 that
“as regards the present ban on political activity, we were interested to
note that except for the communists . . . practically all other Germans
we spoke to favor the present ban."2®

25£EUS-* Potsdam. II, p. 1482.
2®HSunanary of August 1945 report of the Military Governor, U.S.
Zone, Germany," JCS/1517/1, 18 October 1945, National Archives, Box 598.
27Memo from USFET to Commanding General, Western Military District,
19 September 1945, National Archives, Box 598.
2®Memo by Brewster Morris, 16 July 1945, FRUS, 1945. Ill, p. 951.
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Political activity in the U.S. zone picked up somewhat during
September and October, as the Germans began to respond to their newly
granted freedom to reorganize political parties.

The military

government reported that 45 local groups, representing ten parties, had
been authorized at the Kreis level.^

The fragmented nature of the

political organization did not, however, concern the authorities, who
generally wished to discourage a combination of parties from forming a
united political bloc.3^

Generally speaking, though, the German

population was still politically dormant.

Clay would write Secretary of

War Robert Patterson on October 13 that “except for the cities . . .
complete political apathy is reported from nearly every section of Ethel
American zone."3*

However, problems at the quadripartite level would

facilitate the next major step in the democratization of Germany.
John Gimbel has written that the actions of France "left little
doubt that it intended to block the very economic features of the
Potsdam agreement that Americans in Germany had greeted as welcome
relief from the previous limitations of JCS/1067.1,32 Among these
features were the central agencies called for in the political
provisions of the agreement.

The French, however, stubbornly refused to

^"Summary of October 1945 Report of the Military Governor, U.S.
Zone, Germany," JCS/1517/3, 16 December 1945, National Archives, Box
598.
3^Party organizations were not authorized at the Land level until
November 30, 1945.
31Memo from Clay to Patterson, 13 October 1945, Clav Papers, p.
101.

32Gimbel, American Occupation of Germany, p. 17.
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accept this or any part of the agreement, unless certain other
conditions were met, namely the annexation of the Saar and the
internationalization of the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland.

The

French, notably Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, argued that if
Germany's western frontiers were not delineated before centralized
administrations were set up, then there would be little chance that
French views on the Ruhr and Saar would ever prevail.

The feeling was

that once these agencies were set up, it would be virtually impossible
to detach politically those areas under dispute from Germany.33
Acquiescence to the French demands, however, was not forthcoming.
In a letter to the Secretary of State, Winant suggested that the United
States' opposition to the French position was based on the fear of
having "Russians participate in administration of territory so far west,
so strategically located and so industrially important.m3<*
Policymakers, however, seemed equally concerned that separation would
create a German irredenta that would stand as a source of agitation for
years to come.3^

Neither side was willing to concede, and the Control

Council, on this important issue, lapsed into stalemate.

Certain that

some degree of centralization was necessary to perform basic functions
—

such as communications and transport —

the American zone leadership

met with the minister-presidents of the three American Laender (Bavaria,

33Memo from Caffery to Byrnes, 1 March 1946, FRUS, 1946. V, p. 509.
34Letter from Winant to Byrnes, 16 November 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill,
p. 894.
35Memo from Patterson to Byrnes, 11 June 1946, FRUS. 1946. II, p.
487.
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Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Greater Hessen) in October to form the Council
of States, or Laenderrat, an agency to perform these much needed
functions and coordinate services, in lieu of the more desirable
German-wide agencies.3®
This decision, however, was not made without misgivings.

In a

September 29 letter to Byrnes, Murphy called attention to Clay's concern
that "unless central machinery is established promptly, it will have to
be established in the United States zone alone, thus creating a new
artificial political unit."

In addition, Murphy reported Clay's fear

that "this may lead to actual dismemberment."37

Clay, wishing to avoid

the.appearance of creating a separate political unit, stated in his
introductory remarks at the October 17 Stuttgart meeting of the
minister-presidents that, "it must be strongly emphasized that a Zone
authority is not contemplated.

On the contrary, what is involved is a

clearing house and a research agency by which concrete proposals can be
formulated."3®

Clay's concern over possibly provoking Soviet mistrust

was evident also in his decision not to establish in the American zone a
capitol city in which to locate the Laenderrat, a move which might lead

3®"Summary of October 1945 Report of Military Governor."
"Landrat," and not "Laenderrat," is the correct translation of "Council
of States." However, since American policymakers used "Laenderrat" in
their correspondence and documents, I have maintained its use here.
37Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 29 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill,
p. 879.
^Introductory remarks by General Clay at meeting of Land Minister
Presidents, 17 October 1945, Federal Records Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS
Records.
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to charges that the United States was establishing a separate
government.^9

This episode indicates that Clay and the military

government were acting, as they saw it, very much within the framework
of four-power control.

It was a decision based on economic necessity,

and made with considerable hesitation.
With the creation of the Laenderrat the military government was
able to report that by November 1945, German government was functioning
at the village, city, county, state and zonal level.
this was not enough.

For Clay, however,

Despite the occupation's successes “the German

officials were appointees of the occupying authority and were neither
selected by nor responsible to the German people."

Clay felt that the

military government “could neither hesitate nor delay" in getting the
populace actively involved in political activity and, at the appropriate
time, the electoral process.4^
For Clay the appropriate time was as soon as possible.

In a

September 3 letter to McCloy, Clay wrote that he had instructed the
Political Division to set up a program for local elections to be held in
early 1946.

He felt that "this program is one of the most important in

re-establishing democratic attitudes and methods.

It will give the

Germans an opportunity to learn democratic procedures on the lower
levels before undertaking elections for larger units."41

Murphy

3^CIay, p. 86. The offices of the Laenderrat were located in
Stuttgart, already serving as the capitol of Land Wuerttemberg-Baden.
-40Ibid., p. 87.
41Letter from Clay to McCoy, 3 September 1945, Clav Papers, p. 67.
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reported to Byrnes on September 12 that elections would be held in each
of the American Gemeinde in January.

These would be followed in March

by the Landkreise elections, and in May by the Stadtkreise elections.4^
Not everyone agreed with Clay as to the desirabi1ity‘of early elections.
James K. Pollock, Chief of the Governmental Structures Branch, suggested
May elections at the earliest, claiming that it was "out of the question
to complete preparations for Gemeindefn] elections before January.“4^
Clay later remembered telling Pollock that "to learn to swim you have to
get in the water."44
Prior to this immersion of the German people in the ways of
democracy, local government codes (Gemeindeordnungen) had to be drawn up
to govern the elections.

Among the problems to be tackled in the

formulation of these codes were the questions of voter registration and
qualification.

Should former Nazis, for example, be permitted to vote?

Also, how should the problem of residency be addressed?

The immediate

post-war period was a time of tremendous dislocation for many Germans.
While the military government sought above all to encourage the exercise
of the vote, it did not want to encourage people to vote in a community
in which they were only temporarily residing, and in which they did not

4% e m O from Murphy to Byrnes, 12 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill,
p. 961.
43Memo from Pollock to Director, Civil Administration Division, 2
October 1945, Federal Records Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS Records.
44Clay, p. 88.
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have a continuing interest.45

As long as the codes did not conflictwith

occupation policy, however, the military authorities were content to let
the German officials work out the specifics.

This was consistent with

the American belief in the desirability of involving the Germans in all
phases of the democratic process.
By December, voting lists had been completed for the January
elections, and a system for reporting and analyzing the election returns
was prepared.

It was assumed by State Department officials that a
i

system of proportional representation, similar to that used during the
Weimar Republic, would be used for this purpose.

A State memo of

September 19 sent to Murphy by Under Secretary Dean Acheson outlined the
Department's reasons for supporting this method of apportionment
1) No one party [would] acquire too predominant [a]
position;
2) No party [would] assume in any way [a] role of
opposition to occupation administration;
3) No bloc of parties [would] be formed under
coercion. 46
°
On the third point, Murphy was not quite convinced.

A week later, he

wrote to Byrnes that "it is pertinent to point out . . . that
proportional representation favors growth of many parties.

By

preventing predominance of one party, it almost forces formation of
political coalition or bloc, which is the very result we seek to

45"Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections Within the U.S.
Zone," 7 September 1945, Federal Records Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS
Records.
45Memo from Acheson to Murphy, 19 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill,
p. 964.
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discourage."^7

clay, however, reported to Murphy on October 10 that

the election codes then being drafted would most likely reflect this
traditional German method of analyzing elections, plus any minor
modifications which the Germans themselves might suggest.4*®
As scheduled, elections were held on January 20 and 27 in the
smaller Gemeinden (towns under 20,000 people), of which there were over
ten thousand in the American zone.

Considering that only three months

before officials were bemoaning the lack of political activity outside
the cities, the voter turnout was remarkable.

Of the almost five

million eligible voters, 83% responded on election day, a figure
substantially greater than was forecast by officials.

Of the small

number who did not vote, 7% were disqualified for Nazi affiliations.49
Officials conceded that the "rural zone constitutes a special area which
may not reflect majority opinion in Germany" and that "elections were
limited to local issues and personalities."

Nevertheless, they must be

considered a success "as offering the public the chance to vote under
fair conditions and democratic processes of which they showed
willingness to take advantage."®^

4^Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 25 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill,
p. 968.
4®Memo from Clay to Murphy, 10 October 1945, Federal Records
Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS Records.
49Memo from OMGUS to War Department, 6 February 1946, National
Archives, Box 598.
^Memo from OMGUS to War Department, 15 February 1946, National
Archives, Box 598.
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On April 28, 71% of the eligible voters turned out for elections in
the Landkreise and larger Gemeinden, and 80% participated the following
May 26 in the Stadtkreise elections.

Aside from the unexpectedly high

voter turnout, what also satisfied the American authorities was that
many of the officials who had been appointed by the military government
in the early stages of the occupation, had been retained in office by
the electorate.

For Clay, this was an indication "that our appointees

had not been branded as collaborators.”^

Clay was no doubt aware that

the Weimar government that assumed power in 1918 was wrongly accused by
nationalists of betraying Germany, a theme used to great effect by
Hitler to rally disaffected Germans to his cause.

Accordingly, the

apparent support of the German people in 1946 was of considerable
importance to the American leadership, as a sign that their
democratization program was succeeding.
The earliest directives on Germany had called for politicization at
the Land level, as success at the local level became apparent.

In

February 1946 the minister-presidents of the three U.S. zone Laender
were authorized tp prepare preliminary drafts of a Land constitution and
arrange for the election of constitutional assemblies to consider these
drafts.

The delegates were elected by popular vote on June 30, 1946,

and the assemblies convened the following month.

Approved drafts were

then sent to the military government for approval —
deemed necessary —
ratification.

plus any changes

before being submitted to the people for final

One change that was not made concerned proportional

^*Clay, p. 88.
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representation.

Clay appears to have favored the idea in October 1945,

yet wrote later that he did not support the plan, but that it “could not
be considered in violation of democratic principles and [was] therefore
accepted as representing the wishes of the electorate."52

The

constitutions, which reflected the traditional German program of
parliamentary government, were accepted by the Americans and Germans
alike, and by December 1, 1946 had been ratified by the people in the
three Lander.

With 1946 coming to a close it appeared that the military

government had returned to the Germans full responsibility for
seIf-government.
# # *

General Clay left little doubt that the democratic processes
initiated

in the U.S. zone in the fall of 1945, and brought to fruition

during 1946,

were designed to facilitate four-power unity, and were not

a response to any Soviet provocation. .Clay wrote to McCloy on September
3, 1945 (the same letter in which he acknowledged that he had instructed
the Political Division to set up a program for elections) that he was
much encouraged by the general attitude of
cooperation and the apparent desire, especially
on the part of the Russians, to work with us in
solving various problems. 1 believe that we
are making real headway in breaking down their
feelings of suspicion and mistrust.53

52Ibid., p. 89.
53Letter from Clay to McCloy, 3 September 1945, Clav Papers, p. 63.

35

That the concepts of holding democratic elections and improved Soviet
relations each found their way into the same letter is an indication
that Clay did not view U.S. plans to proceed with elections as
particularly controversial, or contrary to maintaining good relations
with their A11ies.
Clay did, however, have certain goals in mind when the military
government undertook the political reconstruction of the American zone.
Clay later wrote that he hoped that
parallel action would be taken in other zones
so that the Allied Control Council would have
no difficulty in setting up for all Germany the
central administrations required by the Potsdam
agreement and so that these administrations
would find the structures of state government
available to facilitate their work.5**
On September 12, Murphy wrote to Byrnes that "this measure [elections]
has not yet been discussed with representatives of the other occupying
powers but will be brought up informally in the political
directorate."5®

A month later, a memo from Clay's office stated that

The U.S. schedules will be presented on a quad
ripartite basis and an endeavor will be made to
secure correlated action which will result in
similar elections under similar electoral methods
throughout all zones simultaneously.®
The memo added that it was impossible "to forecast what results will be
obtained so that it is imperative that we proceed with the schedules as

54Clay, p. 91.
®®Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 12 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill,
p . 962.
55Memo from Clay to Murphy, 10 October 1945.
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currently laid down."57

Officials were not going to allow the issue of

elections to become mired in Control Council deliberations.

Neither

were they going to hold elections uni laterally without consulting the
other occupying powers.
In March 1946, another attempt was made at political unification.
The U.S. suggested that political parties be allowed to function on a
national basis.

This proposal, like the one above, met with failure,

and the politicization of the U.S. zone continued on a course distinct
from the other zones.

By the spring of 1946, quadripartite cooperation,

was beginning to show the strain that deadlock on a variety of issues
had caused.

Accordingly, events at the Allied level would have

considerable impact on the tremendous political accomplishments within
the U.S. zone.

5^Ibid.
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3. Roadblock to Democracy

The revival of German political life had occurred at a fairly rapid
pace, spurred on by the desire of the American occupation authorities to
return to the Germans virtually all responsibility for government.
However, this political revival had presumed the simultaneous
accomp1ishment at the four-power level of the economic, and eventual
political, unification of Germany.

The failure of the Allies to develop

the machinery for unification left the American zone in political limbo.
The re-establishment of German government in the U.S. zone had been
predicated on the notion that it would serve as a basis for future
national government.

This step, however, seemed at best a long way off,

effectively meaning that German government in the U.S. zone had for the
time being gone as far as it would go.

Yet, it appears also that

American officials, concerned primarily with German economic unity, were
content to put further democratic growth on hold.

Doing so, however,

proved more difficult, as the momentum of German democracy would not be
easily slowed.

The awkwardness of this situation most likely was not

seen until 1946, but the roots of the problem can be detected in the
early occupation period.
It has been mentioned that the creation of the Laenderrat in
October 1945 was a step born out of necessity by the failure of the four
occupying powers to agree to the implementation of the Potsdam
agreement, calling for the creation of central agencies.

Furthermore,

this step was seen as being a purely economic one, evidenced by Clay's
decision not to create a capitoI for the Laenderrat, for fear of it
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being possibly misunderstood as a political move.

With American policy

consistently calling for the decentralization of the political
structure, the creation of a central agency with a political function
would hardly seem appropriate.
This suggests that American authorities were confident they could
keep separate the economic and political development of the U.S. zone.
Yet, with the creation of the Laenderrat, and the initiation of
democratic processes, two components of the occupation moved onto a
collision course.

The resulting clash received its impetus from the

continued French refusal to agree to the Potsdam proposals.

Eventual

deterioration of Soviet-American relations would color the way
contemporaries, notably Clay himself, viewed the Soviet role in the
occupation of Germany,* but in early 1946 the main obstacle to
four-power unity was perceived to be France.

In April, a frustrated

Clay recommended to Byrnes that the French be informed that unless they
concurred immediately to the establishment of central agencies, "all
shipments of wheat to the French zone of Germany will be discontinued,"
and "shipments Cof] wheat to France will also be discontinued if French
still unwilling to a g r e e . T h e State Department, however, refused to
exert more than nominal pressure on the French, fearing that doing so
might topple the fragile coalition government in France, and usher into
power elements, such as Communists, hostile to American interests.^

*Clay, pp. x-xi.
^Memo from Clay to Byrnes, 11 April 1946, Clav Papers, p. 190.
^Memo from Caffery to Byrnes, 1 March 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, p. 511.
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This episode is an excellent example of the divergence in State
Department and OMGUS opinion regarding the obstacles to agreement in
Germany.

The State Department, with such men as George Kennan setting

the tone, had a considerably greater mistrust of the Soviet Union than
its OMGUS counterparts in Berlin.4

While State was concerned that

pressure on the French might facilitate the Communists assuming power,
OMGUS was concerned that the absence of pressure would damage whatever
chance existed for four-power agreement and, therefore, unification.
The difference, Jean Edward Smith suggests, was that "those closest to
the Russian presence in Germany did not despair of Soviet cooperation."^
More than that, it indicates that the State Department was beginning to
look beyond Germany, focusing rather on the larger implications of their
German policy.

OMGUS policy was neither intentionally anti-Soviet nor

anti-French, but pro-unification, and it concerned officials that the
State Department posture was growing more anti-Soviet, while relations
in Germany remained relatively cordial..
This should not imply, however, that tension did not exist between
the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviets had suffered

tremendous human and material loss during the course of the war, and
consequently Soviet officials expected, if not demanded, some help in

4In February 1946 Kennan would issue his 7 long telegram'' from
Moscow on the sources of Soviet conduct, a forerunner to his July 1947
'X' article, the intellectual argument for containment. In 1946, the
appeal of the telegram within the State Department would elevate Kennan
to a prominent position as head of the Policy Planning Staff.
5Jean Edward Smith, "General Clay and the Russians: A Continuation
of the Wartime Alliance in Germany, 1945-1948." Virginia Quarterly
Review 64 (1988): 22.
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the reconstruction of their war-torn country.

It was further expected

/
that this help would come through reparations, which the Russians would
exact in two ways.

First, the Soviets would physically remove from

Germany capital equipment from its remaining heavy industry to
compensate for Russian industry destroyed by the war.

Secondly, the

Soviets expected to benefit from the resumption of German industry, by
appropriating part of their current production for Soviet use.
Problematic in this was that since the major industrial areas did not
all lie in the Soviet zone of occupation, reparations would in part
involve the dismantling and removal of industry from the western zones.^
Recognizing Russia's post-war reconstruction needs, the United
States agreed in principle to support a reparations plan, though
American policy prevented the authorities from ever fully satisfying
Soviet expectations on the issue.
the aftermath of World War I.

American skepticism had its roots in

The Versailles participants had imposed

upon defeated Germany a reparations figure completely out of proportion
with their ability to pay.

Heartened by the Weimar government's attempt

at democracy and the apparent desire of Germany to assume the role of a
responsible world power, the United States sought to lessen the burden
of the reparations through loans, under the auspices of the Dawes Plan
C1924) and the Young Plan (1929).

These loans had the combined effect

of indirectly subsidizing those countries receiving German reparations,

^Under the original reparations plan, the Soviet Union was entitled
to 25% of the capital equipment in the western zones slated for
dismantling and removal.
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as well as providing Germany with the financial means to rebuild
mi 1itarily.
Oddly enough, in the post World War II period, American reluctance
to participate in a reparations scheme survived a complete shift in
policy.

When the influence of Henry Morgenthau was at its peak, the

United States was determined to de-industrialize German industry to the
point that she would never again be able to wage war.

However,

providing reparations to the Russians, on the scale they sought,
possibly would entail the revival of German industry to a level not
contemplated under pastoralization schemes.

Even the State Department,

far from subscribing to Morgenthau's severe de-industrialization plan,
was concerned in January 1945 that "reparations should not become a
pretext for increasing Germany's Capacity to pay/ by rebuilding its
productive power."7

Morgenthau's influence died with Roosevelt, leaving

the door open for the State Department's multilateral view to
predominate in policy-making.

In a complete departure from Morgenthau,

State saw limited German industrial revival as crucial to the
revitalization of Europe, a necessary component in State's economic
world view.

Bruce Kuklick has written that State believed "Germany

would not easily take her place in a multilateral order if she were to
pay substantial recurring reparations."®

Reparations, once seen as an

7,1Department of State Recommendations for the Economic Treatment of
Germany," SC-16, 2 January 1945, National Archives, Record Group 353.
®Bruce Kuklick, American Po1icv and the Pi vision of Germany
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 124.
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undesirable growth stimulus, became an equally undesirable growth
inhibi tor.
American officials felt that the implementation of the central
agency provision of the Potsdam agreement would be the best
quadripartite expression of multilateral intentions.

To help break the

impasse in the Control Council, Clay in May 1946 ordered a halt on all
dismantling and reparation removals fron the U.S. zone, effective until
agreement on economic unification was reached.9

Kuklick has argued that

it was a distinctly anti-Russian move, designed to pressure the Soviet
Union into integrating Germany into a multilateral order.10

The State

Department, however, maintained that the reparations halt was a
temporary measure designed to shake up the Control Council (France and
Great Britian were also receivingGerman reparations, though in smaller
amounts), and stimulate action on the question of economic unity.11

In

this respect, the reparations issue was merely a lever used to achieve
the greater goal, for which the main obstacle was not the Soviet Union
(the Soviets would maintain their support for central agencies until
August 1946), but the French.

In July, Clay reiterated his conviction

that "French unwillingness to enter into agreements relative to
governing Germany as a whole makes it difficult to place blame on the

9Letter from Clay to Echols, 2 May 1946, Clav Papers. p. 204; Press
Conference (Clay), 27 May 1946, Clav Papers, p. 218.
10Kuklick, p. 137.
^U.S., Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Pol icy and
Progress. 1945-46. 1947, p. 34.
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S o v i e t . " S k e p t i c s of the Soviet Union, however, wouid receive some
vindication by the events of mid-1946.

* * #

Throughout 1946 the French continued to press their claims for the
Saar region as a precondition to their consideration of a plan for
central economic agencies.

And while OMGUS officials still considered

the French to be the primary obstacle to economic unity, some in the
State Department were beginning to question Soviet motivations.

In

March, Kennan wrote to Byrnes that "I would by no means accept it as a
foregone conclusion that Russians have really been eager, up to this
time, to see central German administrative agencies established."^
French intransigence on this issue, Murphy wrote in February, has
"played directly into the hands of the Soviet Union which has taken full
advantage of French obstructionism to consolidate the Soviet position in
eastern Germany."

Murphy observed further that "the United States and

United Kingdom must sympathize with the French view because if they
[U.S., U.K.] didn't they possess ample means to persuade France to agree
to Potsdam."

It would be difficult, Murphy continued, for the Russians

or the Germans "to believe that France is acting independently without

^Memo from Clay to McNarney, 23 July 1946, Clav Papers, p. 244.
l^Memo from Kennan to Byrnes, 6 March 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, p.
517.
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the tacit or active approval of the U.K and/or U.S."14

The State

Department's failure to persuade France to yield allowed them, in
Gimbel's words, "to exercise influence in Germany far greater than the
postwar national power they possessed would have otherwise seemed to
permi t."16
The Soviet Union had consistently advocated German unity, which
gained them a considerable amount of support among the German people.
Like the United States, the Soviets simultaneously consolidated their
own position in Germany, all this while France maintained her opposition
to central agencies.

If people felt that the obstacle to unity was the

French, but with American consent, then the burden of the failure of the
Potsdam agreement could fall squarely on the shoulders of the United
States.

Dean Acheson was one determined to avoid this eventuality.

On

May 9 the Under Secretary of State wrote Byrnes that assuming "U.S.
insistence on treatment of Germany as economic unit has been motivated
primarily by U.S. interest in preventing permanent division of Germany,"
then a plan should be designed “to force Soviet Union to show its real
attitude toward unification of Germany . . . and to avoid any danger
that Soviets might put onus of breaking with Potsdam on United
States."16

14Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 24 February 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, p.
506.
15John Gimbei, "On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An
Essay on U.S. Postwar German Policy." Political Science Quarterly 87
(June 1972): 247.
16Memo from Acheson to Byrnes, 9 May 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, pp. 550-1.
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Clay's own concern over the deteriorating economic situation in
Germany prompted him to suggest that Germany be centralized into as
large an area as possible.

At the Council of Foreign Minister's meeting

in Paris in July 1946, Byrnes offered the other three zones the
opportunity to join with the United States in treating Germany as an
economic unit, thereby fulfilling the Potsdam agreement.

On July 30,

the British accepted the invitation, the only other power that would do
so.

Byrnes' thinking was made clear in a landmark speech in Stuttgart

on September 6, 1946.

He reiterated the United States' commitment to

economic unification, and added that the "time has come when the zonal
boundaries should be regarded as defining only the areas to be occupied
for security purposes . . . and not as self-contained economic or
political units.n1^

Any doubts concerning American commitment to

economic unification were removed when the U.S. and Great Britain signed
an agreement in New York in December creating Bizonia, to go into effect
January 1, 1947.

Doubts, however, did exist as to what this new

agreement would mean to the political development of the U.S. zone.

The

almost unhindered growth of democracy in the American zone had come up
against a formidable roadblock, the effect of which was to have
important consequences for the future of Germany.
* # #

^U.S., Department of State, "Address by Secretary of State,"
Bui let in. 15 September 1946, pp. 497-8.
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Concerning the bizonal merger, Clay would later write that the
"joint administration of the two zones was started not in the interest
of political reconstruction but as a practical step toward better
economic conditions within the area, thus reducing the burden of support
borne by the occupying powers."*®

At the time, Clay wrote that "I do

have to preserve the political structure in our zone and protect the
delegated policy which we have given German officials.

This may offer

some problem . . . but I am sure that it is one we shall be able to
handle."*^

This casual attitude suggests that OMGUS had not prepared

for the political consequences of Bizonia, a lack of understanding which
put it in danger of undermining all that they had achieved of a
political nature since mid-1945.

The problem was that the American

authorities had not completely abandoned hope for some understanding
with the other two occupying powers, and they were consequently
reluctant to give Bizonia a political structure which might signal a
permanent division of the country.
Throughout 1946 the political development of the American zone
proceeded on a schedule already discussed.

On the heels of the decision

in July to merge with the British zone in 1947, interzonal communication
and cooperation began, taking the form, for example, of conferences of
the minister-presidents of both zones.

Such exchanges had the effect,

according to Gimbel, of facilitating "the development of German

18C1ay, p. 163.
*9Letter from Clay to Brian Robertson, Deputy Military Governor,
U.K., 31 July 1946, Clav Papers, p. 245.
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political forces and coalitions with interests of their own . . . ."20
Yet, in keeping with its desire to avoid the appearance of political
union, the military government opposed the creation of a
popularly-elected bizonal legislature.

It did establish bizonal

economic agencies to address certain interzonal problems.

These

agencies were created unilaterally under the authority of the military
government, rather than the people.

This was taking place as the OMGUS

democratization program was going forward "amidst much propaganda about
the tremendous progress American-zone Germans were making toward
self-government and local responsibility."2*
OMGUS had found itself in the unenviable position of having to
choose between its zonal democratization program and its bizonal
economic interests.

In short, economic necessity prevailed.

The

military government had established the institutions of self-government,
then stripped them of authority in favor of its own bizonal economic
program.

Clay later described the inevitable effect on the state

governments, which "felt that they represented more nearly the will of
the German people and therefore accepted the rulings of the bizonal
agencies reluctantly and sometimes only after they were required to do
so by military government."22

Finally, in May 1947, with the

possibility of four-power unity diminishing rapidly, the United States
and Great Britain established a strengthened bizonal administration

20Gimbel, American Occupation of Germany, p. 70.
21Ibid., p. 63.
22Clay, p. 173.
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designed to place greater responsibility in the hands of the Germans.
Bizonia, which had been intended as an economic expedient, had been
recognized as a political entity, a step of great significance as
Germany began the seemingly inevitable march toward division.

* # *

The United States had pursued in Germany a policy that it felt
would facilitate the unification of the occupied country.

Yet, as the

democratization program enjoyed one success after another, Germany was
gradually moving away from, rather than toward, unification.

Kuklick

has suggested that American policy may not have been intentionally
divisive, but that in fact it was s o . ^
important.

The distinction, however, is

Much emphasis has been placed here on the intent of those

American officials in Germany charged with the responsibility of making
and implementing policy.

What this has shown is that American actions

in the early occupation period were motivated by a spirit of cooperation
and a desire for unification.

This spirit, however, could not survive

in the increasingly tense climate outside of Germany.
The State Department took a dim view of the prospects for
cooperation, especially with the Soviet Union, an outlook likely
inspired by their multilateral world view. . These officials saw in the
Soviet Union a formidable obstacle to their conception of a worldwide
free-market economy.

If cooperation with the Soviets could produce such

an economy, so much the better.

But cooperation should not be confused

^Kuklick, p. 65.
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with compromise.

The State Department was more than willing to

cooperate with the other three powers on unification, but on American
terms.

Men such as longtime Secretary of State Cordell Hull subscribed

to what Arthur Schlesinger has called the universal’ist approach to
diplomacy which, simply put, meant that "all nations shared a common
interest in ail the affairs of the w o r l d . T h e s e men had no desire to
divide the world into spheres of influence, thereby relinquishing the
opportunity to exert political and economic influence on a global basis.
Yet, the harder they pressed their universalist claim, the more real
became the possibility of an economically divided world.
This universalist vs. sphere-of-influence debate, however, was
waged in Washington, not in Germany.

The point is that the military

government and the State Department differed in opinion because they
differed in perspective.

The February 1947 Truman Doctrine, which many

consider to be the United States' unofficial declaration of the Cold
War, preceded by more than a year the breakdown of the Control Council
in March 1948, which effectively ended any hopes for German unification.
The considerable lapse of time between these two events can be
attributed to the fact that Cold War tension originated in Washington
and Moscow, and only slowly filtered down to the negotiating parties in
Germany.

Of course, it is doubtful that much chance for unification

existed once the governments of each country had engaged in hostile
declarations toward the other.

But it does give some indication that

^Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War." Foreign
Affairs 46 (October 1967): 26.
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those in Germany did not early on abandon hope, or the negotiating
table, because of conflict at the international level.
Accordingly, Gimbel has written that it is "generally inaccurate,
misleading, and unhistorical to speak of the contrast between an Eastern
and Western (or a Soviet and an Allied, or a Russian and a 'free world')
position on the issues of G e r m a n y . " ^

The Cold War did not originate in

Germany, though the tremendous tension engendered by the superpower
conflict would later surface there.
dramatic fashion.

When it did surface, it did so in

In April 1948, on the heels of the Control Council

collapse, the Soviet Union cut off all land access to Berlin, forcing
the United States to supply the German people through an airlift.

The

lifting of the blockade in May 1949 prompted the formation of the West
German government.

This government no doubt reflected the failure of

the superpowers to reach agreement for the unification of Germany, as
well as the American desire to reintegrate the country into the European
economy.

But, ironically, the formation of this government re 1ied quite

v heavily on a political structure introduced at a time in Germany when
optimism set the tone, and unification was the plan.

^Gimbel, "On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement," p. 247.
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Conclusion

The political reconstruction of western Germany after World War II
went through three distinct stages: the establishment of zonal and Land
political structures, the fusion of the American and British zones —
first economical 1y, then politically —
West German government in 1949.

in 1947, and the creation of the

The first stage, most actively pursued

in the U.S. zone, was accomplished not to facilitate division, but to
provide a framework within which quadripartite control could operate
when agreement was reached on economic unification.

Political

reconstruction, however, quickly outran economic agreement in the
Control Council.

When the economic realities of Germany's condition

made delay intolerable, unification with as many zones as possible
became mandatory.

The irony of the merger is that the American

authorities, who had labored in 1945 to encourage political activity,
sought to discourage the Germans from seeking a political role for
Bizonia.

That the Americans were willing to undermine the very

political revival they had sparked was evidence of first, the economic
primacy of their mission and second, their intense desire to avoid the
appearance of having created a separate German political entity,
Most importantly, though, the willingness to undermine the
democratic growth of Germany showed a genuine lack of understanding for
the nature of democracy.

The occupation's political program had sought

to instill in the German people a respect for the democratic process,
and a desire to govern the country in a democratic fashion.

After all,

it was anticipated that the United States would not always be in
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Germany, and if a genuinely democratic Germany were to eventually
emerge, it would do so under the auspices of the German people, not the
United States.
When the 1946 elections brought such a tremendous response, the
American authorities undoubtedly felt that democracy was making inroads
into the thinking of the people.

Likewise, the desire in 1947 to

establish a popularly-elected political structure for Bizonia seemed a
natural progression for a nation and its leadership looking to
re-establish itself on a democratic basis.

Halting this political

momentum, as American officials then sought to do, suggests that the
occupation engaged in what John D. Montgomery called an "artificial
revolution."*

They sought radical change in the German political

structure, and in the attitudes of the people, but they wanted to
regulate that change and dictate how far it would go.

Obviously, this

most un-democratic behavior set a poor precedent for the German people.
The United States would eventually yield to the inevitable political
implications of Bizonia, but that they did so hesitantly is an
unfortunate blot on their record.
That they did so unwillingly, however, also attests to their desire
to prevent Germany's division.

Furthermore, this desire implied a

willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, which would be necessary
if unification was to be achieved.

Before his death, Roosevelt had

expressed the opinion that Germany would be the proving ground for

*John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free: The Artificial Revolution
in Germany and Japan. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
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Soviet-American cooperation.

This cooperative spirit would permeate

OMGUS policy after his death, but it quickly fell out of favor with the
more anti-Soviet State Department, most likely because of the threat the
Soviet Union posed to State's vision of a multilateral world economy.
Consequently, attempts at cooperation in Germany were often frustrated
at the administration level, where Soviet-American tension set the tone.
This tension would eventually divide Germany, helped in no small way by
the political progress of the American zone and then Bizonia.
Ironically, a program that had been undertaken with unification in mind,
would eventually assist in the defeat of this objective.
The conception of Germany as the primary proving ground for
Soviet-American cooperation never materialized.

If it had, the

complexion of the post-war world might be significantly different than
it is today.

But for each side, the Soviet Union and the United States,

the differences were too fundamental and the stakes too high, to simply
allow the affairs in Germany dictate the disposition of the post-war
world.

No doubt Roosevelt would have appreciated the relative

cordiality that remained in Germany after relations between Wahington
and Moscow had soured, but by 1947 it mattered little.

The nation whose

defeat had galvanized the Allied nations during World War II, had been
relegated to the status of just another actor in the emerging drama of
the Cold War.
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